systemd-cryptsetup, systemd-cryptsetup@.service — Full disk decryption logic
systemd-cryptsetup  [OPTIONS...]  attach   VOLUME   SOURCE-DEVICE  [KEY-FILE] [CRYPTTAB-OPTIONS]
systemd-cryptsetup  [OPTIONS...]  detach   VOLUME 
systemd-cryptsetup@.service
system-systemd\x2dcryptsetup.slice
systemd-cryptsetup is used to set up (with attach) and tear
    down (with detach) access to an encrypted block device. It is primarily used via
    systemd-cryptsetup@.service during early boot, but may also be called manually.
    The positional arguments VOLUME, SOURCE-DEVICE,
    KEY-FILE, and CRYPTTAB-OPTIONS have the same meaning as the
    fields in crypttab(5).
    
systemd-cryptsetup@.service is a service responsible for providing access to
    encrypted block devices. It is instantiated for each device that requires decryption.
systemd-cryptsetup@.service instances are part of the
    system-systemd\x2dcryptsetup.slice slice, which is destroyed only very late in the
    shutdown procedure. This allows the encrypted devices to remain up until filesystems have been unmounted.
    
systemd-cryptsetup@.service will ask
    for hard disk passwords via the password agent logic, in
    order to query the user for the password using the right mechanism at boot
    and during runtime.
At early boot and when the system manager configuration is reloaded, /etc/crypttab is
    translated into systemd-cryptsetup@.service units by
    systemd-cryptsetup-generator(8).
In order to unlock a volume a password or binary key is required.
    systemd-cryptsetup@.service tries to acquire a suitable password or binary key via
    the following mechanisms, tried in order:
If a key file is explicitly configured (via the third column in
      /etc/crypttab), a key read from it is used. If a PKCS#11 token, FIDO2 token or
      TPM2 device is configured (using the pkcs11-uri=, fido2-device=,
      tpm2-device= options) the key is decrypted before use.
If no key file is configured explicitly this way, a key file is automatically loaded
      from /etc/cryptsetup-keys.d/ and
      volume.key/run/cryptsetup-keys.d/, if present. Here
      too, if a PKCS#11/FIDO2/TPM2 token/device is configured, any key found this way is decrypted before
      use.volume.key
If the try-empty-password option is specified then unlocking the
      volume with an empty password is attempted.
If the password-cache= option is set to "yes" or
      "read-only", the kernel keyring is then checked for a suitable cached password from
      previous attempts.
Finally, the user is queried for a password, possibly multiple times, unless
      the headless option is set.
If no suitable key may be acquired via any of the mechanisms describes above, volume activation fails.
systemd-cryptsetup supports the service credentials logic as implemented by
    ImportCredential=/LoadCredential=/SetCredential=
    (see systemd.exec(5) for
    details). The following credentials are used by "systemd-crypsetup@root.service"
    (generated by systemd-gpt-auto-generator) when passed in:
cryptsetup.passphrase¶This credential specifies the passphrase of the LUKS volume.
cryptsetup.tpm2-pin¶This credential specifies the TPM pin.
cryptsetup.fido2-pin¶This credential specifies the FIDO2 token pin.
cryptsetup.pkcs11-pin¶This credential specifies the PKCS11 token pin.
cryptsetup.luks2-pin¶This credential specifies the pin requested by generic LUKS2 token modules.